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 Executive Summary
The  Access  5  program objective  is  to  develop  methods  and  guidelines  to  routinely  operate
unmanned aerial vehicles in the National Airspace System (NAS), similar to manned aircraft
flight. To achieve the objective of routine operations of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in the
NAS,  UASs must integrate safely into the NAS while causing the minimum impact  on the
existing system. 
Operation of a UAS in the NAS requires that the aircraft perform a set of functions which will
meet mission objectives. A critical element of these functions is to sense and avoid other traffic
in the airspace. Manned aircraft operating in the NAS have a low risk of mid air collision due to
a multilayer approach to collision avoidance. These layers consist of operational procedures, Air
Traffic Control services, on-board collision avoidance systems, and see and avoid. 
This document describes a method to demonstrate that a UAS, operating in the NAS, can avoid
collisions with an equivalent level of safety compared to a manned aircraft. The methods is based
on the calculation of a collision probability for a UAS, the calculation of a collision probability
for a baseline manned aircraft, and the calculation of a risk ratio given by:
Risk Ratio = P(collision_UAS)/P(collision_manned)
A UAS will achieve an equivalent level of safety for collision risk if the risk ratio is less than or
equal to one. 
Calculation  of  the  probabilities  of  collision  for  UAS and manned  aircraft  are  accomplished
through an event/fault  tree. Node probabilities of the event/fault trees are based on historical
data,  previous  safety  studies,  operational  data,  discussions  with  pilots  and  aviation  experts,
simulation  experiments,  flight  tests,  and  analysis.  Event  trees  are  included in  this  document
representing some candidate sense and avoid configurations.
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 1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this report is to describe a safety analysis method to estimate the relative risk of
collision of an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS), as
compared  to  a  manned  aircraft.  Safety  and  risk  ratios  are  based  on  the  calculation  of  the
probability of a Mid-Air Collision (MAC). The safety analysis also evaluates the sensitivity of
the factors contributing to the collision probability. An event/fault tree is used to calculate MAC
probabilities. Two representative event trees are included in this report.
1.2 Scope
The safety analysis in this document addresses risk of collision of UASs in the NAS operating in
class A airspace. It considers the probability of collision under non failure conditions and under
some failure conditions that directly affect the collision avoidance functionality. The collision
probability  calculation  does  not  consider  failure conditions  such as engine  failure,  hydraulic
system failure, structural failure, etc. These failure conditions and the hazards associated with
them will be addressed elsewhere by the Access 5 Reliability Work package. 
Probability  of  MAC is  estimated  using  event/fault  trees.  The  probabilities  of  occurrence  of
primary events will be obtained, calculated, or estimated using historical data, previous safety
studies, existing operational data, analytical methods, simulation and flight test. The event trees
include physical and operational components. The example event trees included in this report
estimate the probability of MAC for UASs using Mode-S/directional antenna  surveillance and
GPS/ADS-B surveillance with Access 5 developed collision avoidance logic.  It must be noted,
however, that the Access 5 project is not proposing or endorsing the use of Mode-S/directional
antenna and/or GPS/ADS-B as the solution system for UAS sense and avoid. 
1.3 Objective
Estimation of MAC probabilities for various collision avoidance and surveillance systems will
complement the definition of Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) defined in “ELOS Comparable
to See-and-Avoid Requirements for Manned Aircraft” [8]. It will provide a quantified evaluation
of collision avoidance and surveillance systems. It will be used to support the development of
functional  requirements  and  reliability  requirements.  The  MAC  probability  estimation  is
performed  in  the  context  of  an  operational  environment  and  using  assumptions  from  the
proposed concept  of  operations.  A MAC,  as  defined  in  section  1.5,  provides  a  geometrical
characterization to be used in simulation and analytical studies. A MAC has been defined such
that any encounter of this nature between aircraft is considered a catastrophic event. No attempt
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 is made to characterize the geometry or contact points of a collision, possibility of surviving a
collision, or other lower level details.   
1.4 Project Sponsors and Participation
The  Access  5  project  is  sponsored  by  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration
(NASA).  The  Access  5  Project  Office  is  located  at  NASA Dryden  Flight  research  Center,
Edwards, California. This report contains work performed under the Collision Avoidance Work
Package 2, Safety Analysis Task.
1.5 Definitions
• Mid-Air Collision (MAC) – An encounter between aircraft that results in a separation from
center of gravity  to center of gravity of 200 feet or less horizontally and 65 feet or less
vertically.  See Section 2.5.1. 
• Critical Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) is defined as separation distance center of gravity
to center of gravity of 500 feet or less horizontally and 100 feet or less vertically [4, 9]. A
Near Mid-Air Collision has also been defined in references [16, 17] as “proximity of  less
than 500 feet to another aircraft” which is interpreted as the closest distance between aircraft
structures.
• Proximity Trajectory – A trajectory in which two aircraft will have a separation of one half
(½) nautical mile or less horizontally and 500 feet or less vertically at the closest point of
approach. This trajectory is defined as an encounter in which there is a possibility of a pilot
identifying the traffic aircraft as a collision threat and taking evasive action which might lead
to an induced collision. The closest point of approach distance is  deliberately selected as a
large distance to include any induced collision possibility. It is assumed that trajectories with
a larger separation at the closest point of approach do not represent a credible threat for an
induced collision. 
• RA encounter – An encounter between aircraft that would result in a resolution advisory
from an operational TCAS II in one or both aircraft. Since the sensitivity of TCAS to issue
RAs  is  selectable,  an  RA  encounter  cannot  be  directly  associated  with  an  encounter
geometry. In many cases, an encounter in which an RA is issued will result in a NMAC if no
changes in trajectories are performed. However, there are cases in which an RA is issued and
no NMAC will result even if no evasive action is taken. For the purposes of analysis, an
encounter between aircraft that does not result in an RA because the TCAS is not operating
or installed, is still consider an RA encounter if an operational TCAS would have issued an
RA.
3
 • Separation – The standard en-route distances that two aircraft must maintain as dictated by
the FAA. Typical distances are 5 Nautical Miles horizontally and 2000 feet vertically; 1000
feet  vertically  for  Reduced Vertical  Separation Minima (RVSM).  No separation standard
distance applies to VFR flight.
• Loss of separation – Current violation of separation minima (time = 0).
• Conflict – A predicted loss of separation. The trajectories of the aircraft are such that a loss
of separation will occur in the future (time > 0).
2. Mid-Air Collision Probability Estimation
The estimation of the probability of MAC is based on an event/fault tree analysis. The estimation
is  based,  as  far  as  possible,  on  a  generic  remotely  operated  aircraft,  making  minimum
assumptions  on  the  system  implementation.  The  generic  concept  of  operations  and  list  of
assumptions  are  included  in  this  section.  Each  of  the  primary  event  probabilities  will  be
calculated or assigned a value and the rationale for the values will be discussed. 
2.1 Risk Ratio Method
One of the objectives of the Access 5 project is to determine the capabilities and requirements of
UASs to  assure that  the risk of collision  is  no higher  than for manned aircraft.  The overall
collision probability of an aircraft in the NAS depends on several factors including operational
procedures, type and density of airspace, type and size of aircraft, air traffic control services,
weather, etc. Figure 2.1 depicts the predominant layers in the NAS to prevent mid air collisions.
Note that not all manned aircraft are required to have on-board Collision Avoidance Systems
(CAS) and that implementations of UASs might or might not have CAS logic at the control
station.
4
 Figure 2.1. Primary Layers in the NAS to Prevent Mid Air Collisions.
The method used to assess the collision avoidance capability of a remotely operated aircraft is to
calculate a risk ratio. The risk ratio is the probability of collision per encounter of a UAS divided
by the probability of collision per encounter of a manned aircraft. The risk ratio calculations in
this report, Section 5, are for manned aircraft without collision avoidance equipment on-board.
However, the event trees and the analysis structure include nodes and events which can be used
to calculate a risk ratio including collision avoidance equipment on-board the manned aircraft.
For the purpose of this safety study, the assumption is made that such factors as procedures and
ATC services will contribute equally to the prevention of a collision for manned aircraft than for
a UAS. Therefore, the risk ratio is based on the comparison of the see-and-avoid factor for a
manned aircraft and the sense-and-avoid factor for UAS.
The assumption that procedures and ATC services contribute equally to collision avoidance for
UAS and manned aircraft  is  not  necessarily  a  sound assumption.  This  will  be addressed by
further  studies  and  simulations.  Specifically,  the  simulation  work  package  is  developing
comprehensive simulations which model the interaction of UAS, ATC, and other NAS users and
operators.
2.2 Concept of Operation
A generic concept of operation is used to identify which parts of the system can have an impact
on the collision avoidance functionality of the UAS. The operation of the UAS is depicted in
Figure 2.2. 
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 Figure 2.2. Functional Representation of UAS Operation.
The aircraft is controlled from a ground/airborne Command and Control Center. A command and
control  (CC) link sends  commands to  the aircraft  and receives  status  data  from the  aircraft
including  surveillance,  systems  status,  location,  flight  parameters,  and  other.  Voice
communication  between  the  UAS,  ATC and  traffic  aircraft  is  relayed to  the  command and
control center via the CC link, a separate link, or both. The CC link and the voice relay link
could be implemented by a single link or by redundant and possibly dissimilar communication
systems.
The UAS is equipped with a Mode-S transponder. The manned aircraft, the UAS own ship and
the UAS traffic might or might not have ADS-B capabilities. Depending on the implementation,
the surveillance of the UAS own ship could be a variety of technologies including radar, infrared,
optical  in  the  visual  spectrum,  TCAS surveillance,  ADS-B reception,  TIS-B reception,  or  a
combination of these or other technologies. The safety analysis can be used to determine the
impact of these technologies on the overall collision risk and evaluate the alternatives.
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 2.3 Assumptions
The assumptions listed in this section are for the purpose estimating basic event probabilities.
They do not reflect the operational guidelines and procedures that could result from the Access 5
project or other previous or current work. 
• The UAS is  assumed to operate in the NAS without any special  operational procedure
distinct  from  manned  aircraft.  No  segregation  between  UAS  and  manned  aircraft  is
performed. 
• The UAS aircraft is Mode-S equipped. The Mode-S transponder might or might not have
extended broadcast capability with ADS -B data.
• All traffic in the UAS operational environment are Mode-S equipped. Traffic aircraft might
or might not have Mode-S transponder with extended ADS-B broadcast capabilities.
2.4 Event /Fault Tree
The event/fault tree is composed of a set of basic (primary) events, probabilistic association of
events represented by logic functions, and compound events that result from basic events or other
compound events. The top-level event gives the probability of a Mid-Air Collision between two
aircraft given that these aircraft are in a collision course or proximity course and does not take
into  account  the  collision  avoidance  capability  of  the  traffic  aircraft.  That  is,  the  collision
avoidance calculation is only based on the capabilities of the ownship. The probabilistic gates
used in the event tree are:
• AND – An event  occurs  if  and  only  if  all  its  sub-events  occur.   The probabilistic  AND
calculation is the product, P1 x P2, of the input events.
• OR – An event occurs if any or all of its sub-events occur. The probabilistic OR calculation is
the sum minus the product, P1 + P2 – P1xP2, of the input events.  In the case of a 3 input OR,
the probability is given by: 
                 P1 + (P2 + P3 – (P2xP3)) – P1x(P2 + P3 – (P2xP3))
     distributing and rearranging,
                 P1 + P2 + P3 – P1xP2 – P1xP3 – P2xP3 + P1xP2xP3
• XOR – (exclusive or) An event occurs if  any of its  sub events occur. The sub-events are
mutually  exclusive;  that  is,  they  cannot  occur  simultaneously.  The  probabilistic  XOR
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 calculation is the sum, P1 + P2, of the input events. An example of mutually exclusive events:
P1, On MAC trajectory, P2, Not on MAC trajectory.
2.4.1 Top Level Tree
The top level tree, shown in Figure 2.3, is common to the manned aircraft see-and-avoid and to
the UAS sense-and-avoid function.
Figure 2.3. Top Level Tree Common to Manned and Unmanned Aircraft.
The probability of a Proximity trajectory when in an en-route environment is the probability that
procedures  in  the  NAS and air  traffic  control  services  have  failed  to  maintain  the  required
separation between aircraft. To calculate a risk ratio between manned and unmanned aircraft, this
probability is set to 1. See Section 2.5.3 for a detailed discussion.
The events On MAC trajectory and Not on MAC trajectory are the geometric probabilities that
given a Proximity trajectory, the trajectory is a MAC trajectory or not. These nodes are mutually
exclusive and their values are calculated in Section 2.5.1. Note that a MAC trajectory is a subset
of a NMAC trajectory and a NMAC trajectory is a subset of a Proximity trajectory. The event No
Maneuver/Unresolved represents the probability that the see/sense and avoid technique will fail
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 to avoid a collision. The event  Maneuver Causes MAC represents the probability that the action
taken to avoid a collision actually causes the collision where no collision would have occurred
had  no  action  been  taken.  The  subtrees  which  lead  to  the  compound  events  No
Maneuver/Unresolved and Maneuver Causes MAC are specific to the avoidance technique and
will be shown in Section 2.4.2 for manned see and avoid and Section 2.4.3 for unmanned sense
and avoid.
2.4.2 Baseline Event Subtrees for Manned Aircraft See and Avoid
The baseline event  subtrees  estimate the  probability  that  a manned aircraft  will  not  avoid a
collision (Subtree A, Figure 2.4) and that the avoidance actions by the pilot cause the collision
when the aircraft were not in a collision trajectory (Subtree B, Figure 2.5). The probability values
for the basic nodes are calculated in the Basic Event section, Section 2.5. The basic nodes are
numerically labeled above the node box to match with the probability calculations. 
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 Figure 2.4. Subtree A for Manned Aircraft.
10
 Figure 2.5. Subtree B for Manned Aircraft.
2.4.3 Event Subtrees for Unmanned Aircraft Sense and Avoid
The event subtrees estimate the probability that an unmanned aircraft will not avoid a collision
(Subtree A, Figure 2.6) and that the avoidance actions by the pilot cause the collision when the
aircraft were not in a collision trajectory (Subtree B, Figure 2.7).
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 Figure 2.6. Subtree A for Unmanned Aircraft.
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 Figure 2.7. Subtree B for Unmanned Aircraft.
2.5 Basic Events
The probability of basic events will be obtained from different sources or calculated. In some
instances, the probability will be obtained from simulation and experiments of other Access 5
work package teams. The probability of failure of the command and control link (CC link) is
such an example.
The events are classified into geometry, equipment, human factors, and logic events. 
13
 2.5.1 Geometry Events
Geometry  events  comprise  events  that  mostly  result  from  the  physics  of  the  encounter.
Inevitably,  there  will  be  some  secondary  effects.  For  example,  the  probability  of  visual
acquisition is directly affected by the geometry of the encounter. However, since the primary
factor for visual acquisition is the pilot, this event is grouped under the human factor events.
MAC and Not MAC probabilities, Nodes 1 and 2
A mid air collision is defined as a separation when the center of gravities (cg) of two aircraft are
200 feet or less of each other horizontally and 65 feet or less vertically. These distances are a
conservative estimate of the volume required to clear most aircraft without structural contact.
Very large aircraft such as the Boeing B747-400 (211 feet wingspan), Airbus A380-800 (262 feet
wingspan),  and  Lockheed  C5A  Galaxy  (223  feet  wingspan)  will  require  larger  volumes.
However, for simplification of simulation and analysis, the collision distance is set to the values
indicated above. 
A critical near mid air collision is defined as an encounter where two aircraft are center of gravity
to center of gravity 500 feet or less horizontally and 100 feet or less vertically [4, 9]. See Figure
2.8. A proximity encounter is defined as a distance where two aircraft are one half (½) nautical
mile or less horizontally and 500 feet or less vertically. 
Figure 2.8. Horizontal and Vertical view of MAC, NMAC and Proximity Volumes.
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 The protected zones for MAC, NMAC and Proximity have been defined such that the diameter
(rather than the radius) are 200 feet, 500 feet and ½ NM, respectively. Therefore, an intrusion to
these zones is when the protected zones of each aircraft overlap, Figure 2.9.  
Figure 2.9. Intrusion into Protected Zone for MAC, NMAC, and Proximity.
The probability that two aircraft are in a MAC trajectory given that they are in a Proximity
trajectory is based on the definitions above. There are two cases to consider when calculating the
probability of collision trajectories. The first is when both aircraft are on level flight. The second
is when one or both aircraft are climbing or descending.
The  following examples demonstrate how the probabilities are calculated. In Figure 2.10, two
aircraft are in a 180 degrees encounter (head on). The location of aircraft 1 along the y axis is
assumed to have a uniform distribution.  The location of aircraft 1 along the x axis does not
15
 affect the closest point of approach distance. The location of aircraft 1 along the z axis (vertical)
is also assumed to have a uniform distribution.
Figure 2.10. Probability of MAC and Proximity Trajectories, Head-on Encounter.
The probability of a collision trajectory given a Proximity trajectory (at level flight),  P(ct|pt-
level), is the probability that horizontally they are within 200 feet cg to cg, P(cth), times the
probability that they are vertically within 65 feet, P(ctv).
P(cth) = 200/3038 = 0.06583
P(ctv) = 65/500 = 0.1300
P(ct|pt-level) = P(ch) x P(cv) = 0.06583 x 0.1300 = 0.008558
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 Note that  this  probability  is  independent  of  the  encounter  horizontal  angle  (crossing angle).
Figure 2.11 shows two aircraft with a 135 degrees encounter angle. Without loss of generality, let
aircraft 1 and aircraft 2 have vertical speeds equal to 250 knots. Their vectorial speeds are:
vx1 = 250*cos(45) = 176.8 knots
vy1 = 250*cos(45) = 176.8 knots
vx2 = -250 knots
vy2 = 0 knots
The relative speeds and angle of motion of aircraft 1 with respect to aircraft 2 are:
vxr = 426.8 knots
vyr = 176.8 knots
Theta_r = 67.5 degrees
Figure 2.11. Probability of MAC and NMAC Trajectories, 135o Encounter, Showing
Closing Relative Horizontal Speed.
A uniform distribution of aircraft 1 over the x and y axes will produce a probability P(cth) of
horizontal collision trajectory equal to 0.06583 as before.  The  probability of vertical collision
trajectory is unaffected by the horizontal angle. In general, the relative trajectory of aircraft 1 will
tangentially intercept a circle around aircraft 2. The probability of horizontal MAC trajectory
given a Proximity trajectory is the ratio of the MAC radius to the Proximity radius.
For  encounters  where  one  or  both  aircraft  are  climbing  or  descending,  the  probability of  a
17
 collision trajectory given a proximity trajectory is based on the horizontal areas of MAC and
Proximity, the vertical area and the relative angle of the aircraft as shown in Figure 2.12. The
location of aircraft 1 is assumed to have uniform distributions on the vertical and horizontal axes.
Figure 2.12. Probability of MAC Given Proximity, Climb/Descent.
The horizontal areas of the MAC and Proximity volumes are:
Area_h_MAC = pi  1002   sq feet
Area_h_proc = pi  15192   sq feet
The vertical area of the MAC and Proximity volumes are:
Area_v_MAC = 65 x 200 sq feet
Area_v_proc = 500 x 3038 sq feet
The probability of MAC trajectory given a Proximity trajectory is:
P(ct|nmt-non-level) = AreaMAC/AreaPROC 
                                = (Area_h_MAC
 
+ Area_v_MAC/Tan α)/(Area_h_proc + Area_v_proc/Tan α)
For an aircraft at 250 knots and 500 feet per minute climb, the trajectory angle with respect to the
horizon is only 1.13 degrees. This give a probability of  MAC trajectory given a Proximity
trajectory of:
P(ct|nmt-non-level) = AreaMAC/AreaNMAC = 0.008461
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 The encounter probabilities of Section 3 are used to obtain the probability of level flight
encounters and non-level flight encounters. Nineteen encounter classes are presented in Section 3
which were obtained from [4]. For each of these encounters, it is determined if the encounter is a
level or non-level flight encounter. Classes 2, 3a, 3b, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, and 19 are level
flight encounters at the closest point of approach. Classes 1a, 1b, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14a, and 14b, 15,
16,  are non-level flight encounters at the closest point of approach. The probability of a level
flight encounter is:
P(level) = P(class 2) + P(class 3a) + P(class 3b) + P(class 7) + P(class 8) +
P(class 9) + P(class 10) + P(class 11) + P(class 12) + P(class 13) + 
P(class 17) + P(class 18) + P(class 19) 
  = 0.27162
The probability of a non-level flight encounter is:
P(non-level) =  P(class 1a) + P(class 1b) + P(class 4) + P(class 5) + P(class 6) +
  P(class 11) + P(class 14a) + P(class 14b) 
                     =  0.72837
The probability of a collision trajectory given a proximity trajectory is computed taking into
account the probability of encounters:
P(ct|pt) = P(ct|pt-level) x P(level) + P(ct|pt-non-level) x P(non-level)
                = 0.008558 x 0.27162 + 0.008461 x 0.72837
                = 0.002325 + 0.006163
    = 0.008488
Node 1 = 0.008488
Node 2 = 0.991512
2.5.2 Equipment Events
These events result from the behavior of the equipment which is installed on the aircraft for the
purpose of collision avoidance. 
Sensor does not Detect, Node 28 (unmanned)
Probability that the detection sensor fails to acquire the target traffic. The sensor could be radar,
infrared, visual spectrum, transponder query (similar to Mode-S used in TCAS), ADS-B receiver,
TIS receiver,  other  technology,  or  a combination of sensors.  The probability  that  a  Mode-S
sensor fails to acquire a target is obtained from reference [1]. The probability that an ADS-B
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 receiver does not detect an ADS-B equipped aircraft is calculated by the tree in Figure 2.13.
Figure 2.13. Probability of Not Detecting Traffic Aircraft.
Equipment  failure probability  is  based  on guidelines  of  the  RTCA DO-242A document  [5].
Section 3.3.6.2, Failure Mode and Availability Considerations, specify that:
Where the ADS-B System is used as a supplemental means of surveillance, the ADS-
B system is  expected  to  be  available  with  a  probability  of  at  least  0.95  for  all
operations,  independent  of  the  availability  of  appropriate  inputs  to  the  ADS-B
system. Where the ADS-B System is used as a primary means of surveillance, the
system is expected to be available with a probability of at least 0.999 for all air-air
operations.
Under  the assumptions  made in  this  analysis,  the unmanned aircraft  is  operated under  ATC
services in Class A airspace. The primary means of surveillance is Primary System Radar and
Secondary System Radar,  PSR/SSR. However,  for this  analysis,  ADS-B is  also used for the
additional functionality of sense and avoid. It is therefore expected that when used for sense and
avoid in addition to supplemental surveillance, a higher availability requirement will be imposed.
A value of between 0.99 and 0.999 is assigned to the equipment failure probability.
The probability of reception failure is calculated based on the work of Ronald Staab, reference
[12]. Assuming a 20 nautical mile range and 5 FRUIT (False Returns Unsynchronized in Time)
the probability of receiving a single message from the traffic aircraft is approximately 0.985. For
a 1 second rate of transmission and a 5 second interval, the probability of missing all messages in
the 5 second interval is:
Reception Failure = (1 – 0.985)5 =  7.59 x 10-10
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 An ADS-B receiver which loses a traffic aircraft messages for longer than 5 seconds will render
the accuracy and integrity of that aircraft as invalid, as defined in RTCA DO-260 and DO-260A
[14,15].  It should be noted that missing all messages from the traffic for a 5 second interval will
not prevent an aircraft from reacquiring the traffic. If the assumption is made that missing to
detect a traffic aircraft for more than 5 seconds will significantly compromise the ability to sense
and avoid, then this reception failure probability could be used.
An aircraft reporting a location through an ADS-B transmission is expected to be no farther away
than a containment radius, Figure 2.14. 
Figure 2.14. Integrity Containment Radius for ADS-B Reported Location.
The Surveillance Integrity Level parameter, SIL, defines how often an aircraft will be outside of
this containment radius as measured from the reported location. The values for this parameter are
shown in Table 2.1.
SIL Probability of Exceeding Containment Radius Reported in NIC without
Being Detected
0 Unknown
1 1 x 10-3 per flight hour or per operation
2 1 x 10-5 per flight hour or per operation
3 1 x 10-7 per flight hour or per operation
Table 2.1.  Surveillance Integrity Level, SIL, and Meaning.
Depending on the requirements imposed on the sense and avoid equipment, the probability of
undetected erroneous data will be in the range of 1 x 10-3 to 1 x 10-7 with a corresponding SIL
21
 value of 1 to 3. An important factor that is undefined by SIL is the latency of the undetected
erroneous data. For example, a SIL of 1 represents that no more than one hour of undetected
erroneous data will be transmitted per 1000 flight hours (or operations). However, a continuous
one hour of undetected erroneous data followed by 999 hours of good data is much more severe
than 1 second of undetected erroneous data followed by 999 seconds of good data. The worst
case is assumed in this analysis, where an aircraft could transmit erroneous data exceeding its
containment radius for long periods of time but that the ratio of erroneous data time to good data
time is in the range 1 x 10-3 to 1 x 10-7.
Node 28 =
P(Mode-S) =    5.000 x 10-3 from reference [1]
P(ADS-B) =     1.100 x 10-2  to 1.000 x 10-3
Data Down-Link Fails, Node 29 (unmanned)
The probability that, at the time of the encounter, the data link which sends traffic information
from  the  unmanned  aircraft  to  the  control  station  and  the  traffic  display  has  failed.  The
probability is calculated as the amount of flight time with a failed link per flight  hour. This
probability is affected by the reliability of the equipment and by the operational rules. Given a
down-link failure, the aircraft might be allowed to continue in normal flight or an abnormal flight
termination might be executed. The probability  for this node is based on the hazard analysis
conducted by the Reliability Work Package of Access 5. The Hazard Analysis classifies the loss
of down link as a minor hazard when an auto-land function is present on the unmanned aircraft
and as major hazard when no auto-land function is present. From Advisory Circular AC/AMJ
25.1309 the level of hazard is related to failure probability as shown in Table 2.2.
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 Effect on
Aircraft
No effect on
operational
capability of
safety
Slight
reduction in
functional
capabilities or
safety
margins
Significant
reduction in
functional
capabilities or
safety
margins
Large
reduction in
functional
capabilities or
safety
margins
Normally with
hull loss
Average
Probability per
flight hour
No
requirement
< 10-3 < 10-5 < 10-7 < 10-9
Classification
of Failure
Conditions
No safety
Effect
Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Table 2.2. Hazard Severity and Probability of Occurrence.
Based on a minor and major classification, the probability of a down link failure is given the
value in the range of 10-3 to 10-5.
Node 29 = 1.0 x 10-3 to 1.0 x 10-5
MFD/ Driver Fails, Node 30
Probability that the traffic data is available at the control station but it is not displayed due to
system display failure. This number is based on a single display with a 15 to 40 thousand hours
mean time to failure for traffic displays.
Node 30 = 6.666 x 10-5 to 2.500 x 10-5
2.5.3 Human Factors
These events are the result of the behavior of the pilots and the air traffic controller, if the ATC is
involved in the event.
Pilot(s) do not see traffic, Node 3 (manned)
This node is the probability that a pilot or pilots will not see the traffic aircraft. This probability
is calculated using a 3 dimensional visual acquisition program described in Section 4. 
A pilot might see the traffic aircraft a few seconds before collision. For the purpose of estimating
the outcome of the encounter, seeing the aircraft a few seconds before the encounter is equivalent
to not seeing it at all as their will not be sufficient time to react. The threshold for calculating
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 whether or not the pilot sees the traffic before collision is set to 5 seconds.
Meteorological conditions affect the capacity of a piloted aircraft to see an intruder aircraft.
Meteorological conditions will also affect sensing devices such as Lidar, and video surveillance.
Visibility and weather conditions are factored in the probability of visual acquisition. Section 3
defines the encounter geometries used to calculate visual acquisition probabilities. Encounter
geometries are grouped into Classes and the crossing angles are varied. Table 2.3 gives the
probability of the own ship aircraft not seeing the target aircraft as a function of crossing angle
for encounter Class 1a. Table 2.4 gives the average probability over the crossing angle range for
the 19 class encounters presented is Section 3.  The probabilities in the table are calculated for
the following parameters:
traffic aircraft: 757-200
true air speed, own: 250 knots
true air speed, traffic: 460 knots
number of pilots, own: 2
climb/descent rates: 500 feet/min
visual range: 20 nautical miles
tau 2: time to collision: 5 seconds
Crossing
Angle,
degrees
Probability
No Visual
Crossing
Angle,
degrees
Probability
No Visual
Crossing
Angle,
degrees
Probability
No Visual
0 1.0000 65 0.0000 130 0.0744
5 1.0000 70 0.0000 135 0.1000
10 1.0000 75 0.0001 140 0.1313
15 1.0000 80 0.0003 145 0.1690
20 1.0000 85 0.0007 150 0.2142
25 1.0000 90 0.0016 155 0.2666
30 1.0000 95 0.0032 160 0.2897
35 0.0000 100 0.0059 165 0.3129
40 0.0000 105 0.0102 170 0.3363
45 0.0000 110 0.0166 175 0.3600
50 0.0000 115 0.0256 180 0.3839
55 0.0000 120 0.0378
60 0.0000 125 0.0539
Table 2.3. Probability of No Visual Acquisition as Function of Crossing Angle.
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 Crossing angles between 0 and 30 degrees give a probability of one because the ownship is
unable to see the intruder aircraft given the field of regard from the cockpit and the geometry of
the encounter. For angles between 35 and 70 degrees, the ownship is able to see the intruder out
of the window and due to the geometry, the closing speeds are relatively slow, given ample
opportunity for a pilot who is scanning the horizon to see the intruder. As the encounter becomes
more a head-on encounter,  for angles 75 to 180 degrees, the closing speeds become greater,
making it more difficult to see the aircraft tau seconds before collision. 
Class Average
Probability
No visual
1a 0.2640
1b 0.2612
2 0.2661
3a 0.2610
3b 0.2610
4 0.2606
5 0.2626
Class Average
Probability
No visual
6 0.2606
7 0.2661
8 0.2610
9 0.2597
10 0.2661
11 0.2626
12 0.2661
Class Average
Probability
No visual
13 0.2610
14a 0.2619
14b 0.2619
15 0.2626
16 0.2624
17 0.2661
18 0.2610
19 0.2597
Table 2.4. Average Probability of Ownship not Seeing Traffic.
Based on a weighed average, taking into account the frequency of the encounters (see Table 3.1),
the probability is set to:
Node 3 = 0.2630
Traffic not Perceived as Threat, Node 5 (manned)
This node represents the probability that a pilot  sees a traffic aircraft  which is in a collision
course or near collision course but does not think the traffic is a threat and does not take any
evasive action. This number is based on discussions with pilots and aeronautical experts and is
not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 5 = 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 10-3
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 Late or no Maneuver, Node 7 (manned)
Probability  that  a  pilot  sees  the  traffic  as  a  threat  but  either  cannot  determine  an  evasive
maneuver,  takes  too  long  to  determine  a  maneuver  leaving  insufficient time  to  execute,  or
initiates the maneuver late. In the case where a CAS is on-board, this node also reflects the
probability that the CAS logic issues a resolution advisory (RA), but the pilot does not execute
the advisory or executes late. (Note that for the analysis presented in this document, it is assumed
that no CAS logic exist on-board the manned aircraft.) This number is based on discussions with
pilots and aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 7 = 1 x 10-1 to 1 x 10-2
Executed Incorrectly, Node 8 (manned)
Pilot determines a maneuver which will provide avoidance, but the execution does not follow the
intended maneuver. This could be the result of insufficient yoke force, incorrect bank angle to
accomplish the intended turn rate, incorrect thrust setting for the maneuver, etc. This number is
based  on  discussions  with  pilots  and  aeronautical  experts  and  is  not  based  on  any
experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 8 = 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 10-6
Pilot(s) Determine Resolution, Node 10 (manned)
When there is a collision avoidance system (CAS) on-board, the pilot will have the option of
following the resolution advisory, RA, issued by the CAS or determining his own resolution
maneuver. It is possible that the pilot determines that a resolution maneuver is necessary but the
CAS logic does not issue an RA. It is also possible that the CAS issues an RA but the pilot
determines that no maneuver is needed. The calculation for the baseline in this document is made
without CAS. Therefore, the pilot will be determining all resolutions and this node is set to 1.
Pilot(s) see traffic, Node 14 (manned)
Complement  probability  to  Node 3.  The Subtree  B estimates  the probability  that  given two
aircraft are not in a collision course, the avoidance maneuver causes a collision. For this to occur,
the traffic must have been detected.
Traffic identified as requiring avoidance, Node 15 (manned)
Given that separation minima will be violated and the two aircraft are in a proximity trajectory
course, the aircraft crew or the CAS logic could identify the traffic aircraft as a collision threat
and determine an avoidance maneuver.  This number is  based on discussions with pilots  and
aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
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 Node 15 = 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 10-5
Pilot(s) Maneuver, Node 16 (manned)
This node estimates the probability that the pilot  maneuvers after identifying the traffic as a
threat and determining a resolution maneuver or receiving a resolution advisory from the CAS
logic  if  aircraft  is  equipped  with  CAS.  This  node  is  associated  with  Node  7  and  is  the
complement of the probability that the pilot will not maneuver.
Pilot(s) Determine Resolution, Node 17 (manned)
The calculation for the baseline in this document is made without CAS. Therefore, the pilot will
be determining all resolutions and this node is set to 1. See Node 10.
Proximity Trajectory, Node 21
The probability of a proximity trajectory is the probability that two aircraft in their current course
will lose separation as defined in section 1.2. Node 21 is the probability that 2 aircraft are in a
loss of separation course or in a collision course. For Node 21 probability, a proximity trajectory
includes a MAC trajectory. The trajectory is considered a proximity trajectory if the two aircraft
are less than 120 seconds to closest point of approach, CPA. That is, if no action is taken by
either aircraft, the aircraft will experience a loss of separation or a MAC in less than 120 seconds.
The time constraint is due to ATC automation. Typically, ATC centers have collision avoidance
logic which will warn controllers of an impeding loss of separation 120 seconds before closest
point of approach. Therefore, for a proximity course less than 120 seconds to CPA, it is assumed
that ATC and procedures will not be a contributing factor to collision avoidance. 
To compare the ability of a piloted aircraft to avoid a collision with the ability of an unmanned
aircraft to avoid a collision, the value of node 21 is set to 1. That is, procedures in the NAS and
ATC services will be factored out for the comparison. In setting this probability to 1, there is an
implicit assumption that a manned aircraft and an unmanned aircraft have the same probability of
being in a proximity trajectory. This assumption is not necessarily valid because manned aircraft
and unmanned aircraft have nominally different missions and flight profiles. To calculate the
overall collision probability of manned and unmanned aircraft, the probability of a proximity
trajectory  will  be  revised  as  more  knowledge  is  gained  about  the  operations  of  unmanned
aircraft. 
Pilot does not See Traffic, Node 22 (unmanned)
Probability that a remote pilot does not scan the traffic display of the control station and does not
see the traffic aircraft before a collision. This probability, in contrast to the manned aircraft, is
not  affected  by  visual  acuity,  size  of  the  traffic  aircraft,  encounter  geometry,  and  weather
conditions. It is affected by work load, attentiveness, training, type of display, and other factors.
There is very limited or no data available for remotely operated aircraft on collision trajectories.
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 In a civilian airspace environment under positive air traffic control, an aircraft will fly ten of
thousands of hours without experiencing a proximity trajectory undetected by ATC and even
more rarely an undetected collision trajectory. The probability assigned to this node is based on
discussions  with  pilots  and  aeronautical  experts  and  is  not  based  on  any  experimentation,
analysis or simulation.
Node 22 = 1.0 x 10-2 to 1.0 x 10-4
Late or no Maneuver, Node 24 (unmanned)
Probability  that  a  pilot  sees  the  traffic  as  a  threat  but  either  cannot  determine  an  evasive
maneuver,  takes  too  long  to  determine  a  maneuver  leaving  insufficient time  to  execute,  or
initiates the maneuver late. In the case where a CAS is at the control station, this node also
reflects the probability that the CAS logic issues a resolution advisory (RA), but the pilot does
not  execute the advisory or  executes  late.  Reference  [1]  estimates the  probability  of  a  slow
response to a TCAS RA in the 0.5444 to 0.680 range. However, for this node, a late maneuver
does not mean a slow reaction but rather sufficiently late that the maneuver is ineffective to avoid
the  collision.  The  probability  assigned to  this  node is  based  on  discussions  with  pilots  and
aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 24 = 1.0 x 10-1 to 1 x 10-3
Executed Incorrectly, Node 25 (unmanned)
Pilot  determines a maneuver or receives a resolution advisory which will  provide avoidance.
However, the execution does not follow the intended maneuver. The probability is obtained from
reference  [1].  Reference  [1]  provides  a  probability  that  given  an  ACAS  (TCAS)  vertical
resolution  advisory,  the  pilot  execute  the  resolution  in  the  wrong  direction.  That  is,  if  the
resolution is to climb, the pilot descends and if it is to descend, the pilot climbs. 
Node 25 = 8.0 x 10-2 to 1.0 x 10-3
Traffic not Perceived as Threat, Node 26 (unmanned)
Probability that a pilot sees a traffic aircraft which is in a collision course or near a collision
course but does not think the traffic is a threat. This probability does not include any type of
warning from a CAS logic. It is the probability that by looking at a symbol on a screen, the
apparent motion of the symbol on the screen, and the altitude and rate of change of altitude of the
traffic, the pilot can identify the traffic as a threat. The type and design of the display will have a
significant impact in this probability. For example, a horizontal (view from the top) display will
make easier to detect traffic at co-altitude approaching from a given bearing. A traffic aircraft at
closely the same horizontal location as the ownship and threatening the ownship by climbing or
descending  will  be  very  difficult  to  detect  as  the  ownship  and  traffic  aircraft  symbols  will
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 overlap. The altitude must be read from the numerical value of the symbol, Figure 2.15.
Figure 2.15. Example of Traffic Display.
The probability assigned to this node is based on discussions with pilots and aeronautical experts
and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 26 = 1.0 x 10-2 to 1.0 x 10-3
Pilot Determines Resolution, Node 31 (unmanned)
This is  the probability  that  the pilot  determines  an evasive maneuver  given that  there is  no
Resolution Advisory from the CAS logic or that the pilot ignores the RA and follows his own
evasive maneuver. Whether or not a pilot decides to follow the CAS logic RA or perform his
own avoidance maneuver depends on operational guidelines, training and other human factors.
This node is the complement to Node 33. 
Node 31 = 1 – Node 33.
2.5.4 Logic Events
logic events refer to the alerts and resolution maneuvers that the CAS, the pilot or the controller
(if a controller is involved) derive based on the data or the perception of the situation.
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 CAS Does not Warn, Node 4 (manned)
This node is in the tree for completness and future analysis. The probability of collision for the
baseline manned aircraft is computed without an on-board collision avoidance system (CAS).
This node value is set to 1.
CAS Logic Does not Warn, Node 6 (manned)
This node is in the tree for completeness and future analysis. The probability of collision for the
baseline manned aircraft is computed without an on-board collision avoidance system (CAS).
This node value is set to 1.
Resolution Incorrect, Node 11 (manned)
Probability that a pilot-generated resolution maneuver fails to avoid the collision. This could be
the result of an incorrect assessment of the encounter or that the traffic maneuvers in a way that
negates the avoidance maneuver of the ownship. Rules of the road as defined in the Federal
Aviation Regulations, 14 CFR Part 91.113 will lessen the chances of two aircraft maneuvering
into each other.  The probability assigned to this node is based on discussions with pilots and
aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 11 = 1.0 x 10-1 to 1.0 x 10-3
CAS Logic Issues RA/ Pilot Selects, Node 12 (manned)
This node is in the tree for completeness and future analysis. The probability of collision for the
baseline manned aircraft is computed without an on-board collision avoidance system. This node
value is set to 0.
RA Incorrect, Node 13
Probability that if there is a collision avoidance system on-board, the resolution generated by the
CAS logic fails  to  solve  the collision.  This  node is  in  the tree for  completeness  and future
analysis. The probability of collision for the baseline manned aircraft is computed without an on-
board collision avoidance system. This node value is set to 0.
Resolution is MAC Trajectory, Node 18 (manned)
Probability that the resolution maneuver determined by the pilot reduces the separation at the
closest point of approach causing a collision where the original trajectories were not collision
trajectories. This probability is dependent on the size of the proximity trajectory. The larger the
proximity trajectory, the lower the probability that an aircraft will maneuver into the traffic. The
probability  for  this  node is  estimated for  the proximity trajectory as  defined in  Section 1.5.
Assuming a purely random maneuver, a geometric analysis similar to that for Nodes 1 and 2 can
be performed. This yields a probability in the order of 0.005 of collision. If the pilots follow the
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 rules  of  the rode,  the probability  of  maneuvering  towards the traffic  should  be significantly
reduced.
Node 18 = 5.0 x 10-3 to 1.0 x 10-5
CAS Logic Issues RA/Pilot Selects, Node 19 (manned)
This node is in the tree for completeness and future analysis. The probability of collision for the
baseline manned aircraft is computed without an on-board collision avoidance system. This node
value is set to 0.
RA is MAC trajectory, Node 20 (manned)
Probability  that  resolution  advisory  maneuver  reduces  the  separation  at  the  closest  point  of
approach causing a collision where the original trajectories were not collision trajectories. This
node is set to 0 based on the assumption that CAS is not present.
CAS  Logic Does not Warn of Traffic Presence, Node 23 (unmanned)
If the unmanned aircraft's control station is equipped with collision avoidance system, this is the
probability that the CAS does not alert the pilot of the presence of traffic. This probability is
highly dependent on the system design. It could be possible that it is undesirable to have a traffic
presence warning as this might cause excessive alerts which lead to pilots disregarding warnings.
A traffic presence warning could also be user selectable and/or sensitivity adjustable with regard
to horizontal and vertical distance. In higher density conditions, sensitivity could be reduced to
avoid excessive alerts. The probability assigned to this node is based on discussions with system
designers, pilots and aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or
simulation.
Node 23 = 1.0 to 1.0 x 10-6
CAS  Logic Does not Warn of Collision Trajectory, Node 27 (unmanned)
If the unmanned aircraft's control station is equipped with collision avoidance system, this is the
probability that based on the data supplied to the CAS logic, the logic does not warn the pilot of
an  impending  collision.  This  probability  is  based  on  simulations  of  conflict  and  collision
avoidance logic. The distinction between conflict and collision avoidance is determined by the
time length of the look ahead time and the horizontal and vertical separation objectives. Conflict
avoidance involves look ahead times in the order of 5 minutes to several hours and horizontal
and vertical separation of 5 NM and 1000 feet, respectively. Collision avoidance deals with look
ahead times in the order of 20 seconds to a few minutes and horizontal and vertical separations of
less  than  0.5  NM  and  500  feet  respectively.  Reference  [10]  shows  that,  given  accurate
surveillance data, the conflict detection logic was successful in detecting all conflicts in more
than  3.3  x  105  encounters.  Reference  [11]  shows results  of  conflict  and collision  avoidance
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 experiments for a terminal or merging area environment in which all conflicts/collision trajectory
were detected for more than 300 operations. The case for erroneous or non-existent data is not
considered by this node and is included in node 28. Based on the simulation experiments, a
probability is assigned for CAS logic not warning of collision trajectory.
Node 27 = 3.03 x 10-6
Resolution Incorrect, Node 32 (unmanned)
Probability that a pilot-generated resolution maneuver fails to avoid the collision. The maneuver
is generated by observing the control station traffic display and determining a suitable maneuver
to avoid the collision. The probability assigned to this node is based on discussions with pilots
and aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 32 = 0.2 to 0.1
CAS Logic Issues RA, Node 33 (unmanned)
Probability that the CAS logic issues an RA and that the pilot decides to follow the CAS logic
RA and does not follow his own resolution maneuver. The CAS logic probability follows from
the same simulation experiments as Node 27. Whether or not a pilot decides to follow the CAS
logic RA or perform another avoidance maneuver depends on operational guidelines, training
and other human factors. The probability that the logic issues an RA is expected to be greater
than 3.3 x 105. Of 170 TCAS reported incidents in reference [13], 8% of pilots chose to ignore
the RA advisory and maneuver based on their own judgment. However, this data is for manned
aircraft with visual capabilities. It is expected that a remote pilot using a traffic display will be
more incline to follow the RA. The probability that the pilot follows the logic is the dominant
factor for this node. 
Node 33 = 0.92 to 0.999
RA incorrect, Node 34 (unmanned)
Probability that the resolution maneuver issued by the CAS logic fails to avoid the collision. In
collision avoidance logic, the resolution calculation is based on projecting the state and velocity
vectors of the intruder aircraft and determining a change in velocity vector of the own ship to
achieve  the  required  avoidance.  When  the  traffic  aircraft  alters  its  course,  the  resolution
generated by the ownship to avoid the collision might no longer achieve its objective. This is the
main reason why an RA fails to avoid the collision. Other less influential factors that might make
the RA fail include aircraft performance, proximity to terrain, high density traffic environment,
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 surveillance data error, etc. From reference [1], the probability that a TCAS generated RA fails to
resolve a collision is estimated to be 9.209 x 10-2 to 8.873 x 10-2 and the probability used for this
node.
Node 34 =  9.209 x 10-2 to 8.873 x 10-2
Pilot detects traffic, Node 35 (unmanned)
This node is the complement to traffic not detected. Traffic is not detected if not on display or the
remote pilot fails to see it on the display.
Traffic identified as requiring avoidance, Node 36 (unmanned)
Given that  separation minima will  be lost  and the two aircraft  are  in  a proximity trajectory
course, the aircraft crew or the CAS logic could identified the traffic aircraft as a collision threat
and determine an avoidance maneuver.  This number is  based on discussions with pilots  and
aeronautical experts and is not based on any experimentation, analysis or simulation.
Node 15 = 1 x 10-2 to 1 x 10-5
Pilot(s) Maneuver, Node 37 (unmanned)
This node estimates the probability that the pilot  maneuvers after identifying the traffic as a
threat and determining a resolution maneuver or receiving a resolution advisory from the CAS
logic. This node is associated with Node 24 and is the complement of the probability that the
pilot will not maneuver.
Mode 37 = 1 – Node 24
Pilot Determines Resolution, Node 38 (unmanned)
This node is the complement to Node 40.
Node 38 = 1 – Node 40
Pilot resolution is MAC Trajectory, Node 39 (unmanned)
Probability that the resolution maneuver determined by the pilot reduces the separation at the
closest point of approach causing a collision where the original trajectories where not collision
trajectories. This probability is dependent on the size of the proximity trajectory. The larger the
proximity trajectory, the lower the probability that an aircraft will maneuver into the traffic. The
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 probability  for  this  node is  estimated for  the proximity trajectory as  defined in  Section 1.5.
Assuming a purely random maneuver, a geometric analysis similar to that for Nodes 1 and 2 can
be performed. This yields a probability in the order of 0.005 of collision. If the pilots follow the
rules  of  the rode,  the probability  of  maneuvering  towards the traffic  should  be significantly
reduced.
Node 18 = 5.0 x 10-3 to 1.0 x 10-5
CAS Logic Issues RA, Node 40 (unmanned)
Probability that the CAS logic issues and RA and that the pilot decides to follow the CAS logic
RA and does not follow his own resolution maneuver. The probability that the CAS issues an RA
is lower than for Node 33 because the aircraft are in a proximity trajectory and not in a collision
trajectory. Whether or not the logic issues the RA depends on the sensitivity of the logic and the
trade  off  between  false  alerts  and  untimely  alerts.  The  dominant  factor  in  this  probability,
however, is the pilots willingness to follow the RA. This probability is estimated from [13].
Node 33 = 0.92 to 0.999
RA is MAC trajectory, Node 41 (unmanned)
Probability that the RA issued by the CAS logic will induce  a collision when the aircraft are not
in a collision course. This probability is estimated from geometrical considerations and from
reference [1].
Node 41 = 5.68 x 10-4 to 1 x 10-5
3. Encounter Geometries
The encounter geometries presented in this section are the encounters used in the TCAS II safety
analysis [4]. The encounters are divided into 19 classes. These encounters were obtained from
terminal  area  radar  observations  in  the  mid  1980s.  The  subset  of  encounters  used  were
encounters considered to have generated an RA by a TCAS unit. Each encounter class is given a
probability  of  occurrence  associated  with  the  frequency  of  observation.  The  encounter
classification is based on the vertical speed of the aircraft before and after the closest point of
approach,  CPA.  For  example,  given  aircraft  A and B  in  the  encounter,  Class  1  defines  the
encounter  in  which aircraft  A is  (changing altitude)  before the CPA,  aircraft  A is  changing
altitude after the CPA, and aircraft B is in level flight before and after the CPA.
In this report, the Classes 1, 3, and 14 are subdivided into Classes 1a, 1b, 3a, 3b, 14a, and 14b.
The subdivision of the encounters into a and b makes a distinction on whether changing altitude
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 is a climb or a descent. The distinction is made because it is expected that the ownship will have
different visual acquisition rates for an intruder that is climbing as opposed to an intruder that is
descending. 
The encounter geometry data does not contain crossing angle information. The crossing angle is
the angle formed by the aircraft's paths as observed from above. That is, the crossing angle is the
difference in bearing of the two aircraft. See Figure 3.23. For the calculation of visual acquisition
probabilities, a uniform distribution is assumed for the crossing angle.
The  data  used  for  the  encounter  geometries  is  based  on  terminal  area  radar  observation  of
manned aircraft. These data might not be representative of en-route encounters and unmanned
aircraft flight profiles.  As more knowledge is gained about unmanned aircraft operations, these
data will be revised.
The encounter classes are represented in the vertical plane in Figures 3.1 to 3.22.
   
Figure 3.1. Class 1a                                Figure 3.2. Class 1b
Figure 3.3. Class 2. Figure 3.4. Class 3a.
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 Figure 3.5. Class 3b. Figure 3.6. Class 4.
Figure 3.7. Class 5. Figure 3.8. Class 6.
Figure 3.9, Class 7. Figure 3.10. Class 8.
Figure 3.11. Class 9. Figure 3.12. Class 10.
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 Figure 3.13. Class 11. Figure 3.14. Class 12.
Figure 3.15. Class 13. Figure 3.16. Class 14a.
Figure 3.17. Class 14b. Figure 3.18. Class 15.
Figure 3.19. Class 16. Figure 3.20. Class 17.
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 Figure 3.21. Class 18. Figure 3.22. Class 19.
The encounter classes are not all likely to occur with the same frequency.  The probability of
occurrence given to each of the encounter class in reference [4] is shown in Table 3.1.
Class P Occurrence
1 0.01733
2 0.00092
3 0.00046
4 0.01205
5 0.00046
6 0.00042
Class P Occurrence
7 0.00002
8 0.00002
9 0.00002
10 0.17004
11 0.57531
12 0.01574
Class P Occurrence
13 0.07914
14 0.05960
15 0.01406
16 0.04914
17 0.00008
18 0.00510
19 0.00008
Table 3.1. Probability of Occurrence.
For each of the class encounter geometry, the encounter crossing angle is varied from 0 to 180
degrees in 5 degrees increments. The top view of the encounters is show in Figure 3.23.
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 Figure 3.23. Top view of Encounter Geometries Showing Crossing Angle.
The probabilities for the tree nodes are computed for 37 crossing angles for each encounter class.
The average probability of collision for the 37 angles is computed and used for the class node on
the event tree. 
Descend and climb rates are set to 500 feet per minute for constant climbs or descents. Descend
and climb rates are set to 1000 feet per minute when the aircraft goes from level flight to altitude
change or from altitude change to level flight. For encounter classes 3a, 3b and 9, the aircraft are
climbing or descending to a point 20 seconds before CPA and leveling off for the segment 20 to
Tvisual seconds before CPA.  
4. Visual 3D Visual Acquisition Program
The visual 3D program was developed to calculate the probability that a pilot or pilots can see a
traffic aircraft during encounters in which the vertical velocity of the intruder or ownship might
not be zero. That is, one or both aircraft might be climbing or descending. This program is a
three dimensional extension of the two dimensional SEE1 program reported in [2].  It is written
in Java and can be executed in various  computer platforms. The program calculates the
probability that a pilot or pilots will be able to visually detect a target aircraft t seconds before the
CPA. The program takes 20 inputs and outputs the acquisition probability. The inputs to the
program are:
Type of aircraft, traffic True air speed, own True air speed, traffic
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 Crossing angle
Climb rate, own
Climb rate, traffic
Visual range
Resolution limit
Field of view, H up
Field of view, H down
Field of view, left
Filed of view, right
Search, pilot 1
Search, pilot 2
Beta 0, search effectiveness
Beta 1, search effectiveness
Tau 1, beta transition, time
Tau 2, Pacq, time
D1, beta transition, range
D2, Pacq, range
Default values for these parameters are:
Visual range: 20 nautical miles
Resolution limit: 1 arc-min
Field of view, H up: 60 degrees
Field of view, H down: -75 degrees
Field of view, left: -120 degrees
Field of view, right 90 degrees
Search pilot 1: 1 (pilot present)
Search pilot 2: 1 (pilot present)
Beta 0: 17000 steradian-sec
Beta 1: 17000 steradian-sec
Tau 1: 180 seconds
Tau 2: 12 seconds
Figure 4.1 shows a 3-dimensional representation of an encounter with the parameters used by the
Visual 3D program. 
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 Figure 4.1. Three Dimensional Encounter as Constructed by the Visual 3D
Program.
These parameters are derived from the inputs given to the program and include rate of change of
aircraft range and angles of view.
The program calculates the probability of visual acquisition for linear trajectories. Trajectories
that change vertical speeds and/or are not linear horizontally are approximated by segments of
linear trajectories. The program does not provide for night time visual acquisition calculations. 
5. Summary and Conclusion
The event trees presented in this paper are a framework to calculate the probability of collision
for manned aircraft and for unmanned aircraft. The top level tree, Figure 2.3, is common to both
trees.  Subtrees  A and B have nodes  that  are more specific  to  manned and unmanned flight
operations. The trees can be used to calculate an absolute probability as well as a risk ratio. A
risk ratio calculation or relative probability has two main advantages:
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 1.By changing only parts of an event tree for the comparison, errors in estimating basic
events affecting both trees are factored out. The effort of the analysis can be focused on
the differences between the trees, which are the more critical factors.
2.Comparing the tree of interest to a well understood and established tree add credibility
and  accuracy  to  the  calculation.  When  a  comparison  is  made  between  a  unmanned
collision  tree and a  manned collision  tree,  the manned collision  tree can be checked
against actual data to make sure that the tree’s absolute value is accurate. Historical data
of collision between manned aircraft can be obtained from the National Transportation
Safety Board.  This  process  will  be similar  to  calibrating  the  tree  that  is  used  as  the
reference. However, the collision between aircraft flying in Class A airspace (FL180 and
above) is extremely rare and presents some statistical challenges.
Using the values assigned to the nodes in Section 2.5, the following risk ratio table is calculated.
The Risk Ratio is the probability of collision of a unmanned aerial system divided by the
probability of collision of a manned aircraft using only see and avoid under VMC (Visual
Meteorological Conditions) with no collision avoidance system on-board. The upper bound is the
probability calculated using the numbers in the range (Section 2.5) that gives the worst outcome.
The lower bound is calculated using the numbers is Section 2.5 for the best collision probability.
Risk Ratio See and Avoid, Manned
Probability of collision
Upper bound
Probability of collision
Lower bound
Sense and Avoid
UAS (Unmanned)
Probability of collision
Upper bound 0.5846 0.9666
Probability of collision
Lower bound 0.1938 0.3203
Table 5.1. Risk Ratio of Sense and Avoid vs. See and Avoid.
When calculating the probability of collision for a manned aircraft, the dominant factor is the
visual acquisition probability. In a clear day with 20 NM visibility and the other factors
described in Section 2.5.3, a pilot has approximately a 25% probability of not seen a traffic
aircraft in a collision course. 
A remotely piloted unmanned aircraft has a much higher probability of detecting a traffic aircraft
in a collision course. This was based on Mode-S surveillance or ADS-B following RTCA-DO-
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 260 or 260A requirements. The dominant factor affecting the probability of collision for a
remotely piloted UAS is implementing the avoidance maneuver.
The risk ratio calculations suggest that an UAS can achieve a comparable level of safety to see
and avoid. It is important to note, however, that some of the values assigned to the nodes are
based on opinions from pilots and aeronautical experts. More extensive analysis and simulation
is required to validate the node probabilities. Also noteworthy is that these probabilities are for
the ownship avoiding the traffic. It does not take into account the probability that the traffic
aircraft will see/sense the ownship and avoids it in cases that the ownship fails to see/sense the
traffic.
The risk ratio calculations have been made for a manned aircraft with two pilots and without
collision avoidance equipment on-board. The event trees and analysis structure, however, are
built such that the calculations can be made for a maned aircraft with a collision avoidance
system on-board such as TCAS. These calculations could be performed in future work.
6. Acronyms
ACAS – Airborne Collision Avoidance System 
CAS – Collision Avoidance System
CCA – Cooperative Collision Avoidance
CI – Controller Instruction
CPA – Closest Point of Approach
ELOS – Equivalent Level of Safety
FL – Flight Level;   FL400 = 40,000 feet
MAC – Mid-Air Collision
NAS – National Airspace System 
NASA – National Aeronautic and Space Administration
NMAC – Near Mid-Air Collision
RA – Resolution Advisory 
ROA – Remotely Operated Aircraft
RVSM – Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
TCAS – Traffic and Collision Avoidance System
UAS – Unmanned Aircraft System
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